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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. OSCAR SHIPP.
Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Homicide--Appeal-Harmless Error.-In a murder prosecution, it was ('nor to dpny defendant's request that a police
officer's investigation report concerning his activities in the
case be produced, but such t'nor was not prejudicial, even
assullling that the report would have impeached the oificer and
neutl'alized his test.imony, which tended to prove defendant
robbed th<; victim and tended to discredit defendant's testilIIony, \\"hel'e def(·ndant admitted that he committed the robbery :Uld t1H'l'e was overwhdming evidence corroborating that
admission, wher(', in view of contradictions and inconsistencies
in ddenilnnt's te8timony and the implausible explanations
offered by him, it was not reasonably probable that without the
officer's tpstimony the jury would have believed defendant's
testimony, Hnd where, in view of other evidence. relating to
defendant's benting of the victim, it was not reasonably probable that without the iofficer's testimony the jury would have
found defendant innocellt of the beating that cnused the viet illl's death.
[2] Delinquent Children-·Suspension of Crimina.l Proceedings.That Welf. & Inst. Code, § 604, subd. (b), relating to suspension of criminal proceedings against minors, gives the court
di:;cretion to deny certification to juvenile court if the minor
i:s from .18 to 20 years of age, rnther than make such certification mandatory as suhd. (n) docs in the cnse of a minor under
18 years of age, does not make the statute unconstitutionally
vllgue, since the trial judge must exercise the discretion given
by subd. (b) reasonably and in furtherance of justice and to
serve the purposes of the. Juvenile Court Law.
[3] Id.-Suspension of Crimina.l Proceedings.-It was not an abuse
of discret.ion to refuse to certify a 19-year-old defendant to the
juvenile court where the charges against him (robbery and first
degree lIIurder) justified the conelusion that he was not a fit.
subj('ct for consid('ration in that court.

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, ApP(,(ll and Error, § 616; Am.Jur., Homicide
(1st ed § 586).
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Delinquent, Depend<.·nt nnd Neglected Childl'cn, § 19.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 261; [2, 3] Delinquent
Children, § 14; [4] Jury, § 103(7); [5] Criminal Law, § 1011.1; [6]
Criminal Law, § 632.
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[4] Jury-Challenges-Questions as to Death Penalty.-The court
in a lllurder case did not err in excusing on its own motion
prospective jurors conscimtiously opposed to the dl'nth penalty.
[5] Criminal Law-Judgment-Procedure for Determining Penalty.
-The provisions of Pen. Code, § 190.1, establishing the bifurcated trial of a criminnl case in wldch the pennlty is death or
life imprisonment, are mandatory and may not be waived by a
defendant who wishes the issues of guilt and penalty to be
tried together; the fact that such provisions cannot be waived
docs not make the statute uncoustitutional.
[6] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Pena.lty Phase of Case.-On the
penalty phase of a mui'der prosecution, it was not error to refuse to allow defense counsel to read to the jury a newspaper
article apparently reporting an attempt to abolish the death
penalty in the Legislature in connection with his argument
that the death penalty is not morally permissible in any case,
since such argument was improper, and where the newspaper
article had not been introduced in evidence nnd did not stnte
matters of common knowledge of which the jury could take
judicial notice.

APPEAL, autolllaticallytaken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a ju\:Igment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. LeRoy Dawson, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for robbery and for murder. Judgment of COllviction imposing the death penalty on the murder count, affirmed.
Burton Marks, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Jack E. Goertzen, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Oscar Shipp and La Verne Jones were
found guilty of the robbery of Bernard Wilkinson (Count I)
and the robbery and first degree murder of Albert Hawley
(Counts II and III). For the murder of Hawley the jury
fixed the penalties as death for Shipp and life illlprisomnent
for Jones. Jones does not appeal. Shipp's appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
The defendants and both victims were residents of the President Hotel in Los Angeles. Late in the evening on December
30, 1961, two men assaulted and robbed Wilkinson in his room.
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He was unable to identify his assailants. He testified that he
was beaten ullconscious, that he suffered three broken ribs and

numerous cuts and bruises on l1is face, that bet\veen $7.00 and
$8.00 were taken from his person, and that a cigarette lighter
was taken from his room.
Hawley occupied a room one floor above Wilkinson's. The
110tel manager fonnd him there on the morning of December
31, and observed that his face was bloody, The manager asked,
"Who done itt" and Hawley replied, "Two white men." The
police were called, and Officer Hickey was the first to arrive at
the hotel. He testified that Hawley's room was disarranged
and that Hawley's face was bloody and his shirt open. Officer
Hickey saw a foot impression on Hawley's chest. A pocket
was ripped from his trousers.
Hawley told Officer Hickey that during the night someone
knocked at his door and said "This is the management."
As he opened the door two men pushed in, knocking him down.
They beat him on the head and body and kicked him numerous
times. Hawley said that ten cents was taken from him. When
asked who had done it, he said, "Two white men." After
Hawley was taken to the hospital, Officer Hickey asked him for
a further description, and Hawley said, "I don't really know.
I didn't see them."
Hawley died on January 5, 1962. Dr. Kade, the autopsy
surgeon, testified that the autopsy revealed over 20 rib fractures, three fractures of the sternum, a fractured vertebra,
pulmonary contusions, hemorrhage inside the chest, extensive
discoloration across the front and sides of the chest, and
various head, face, and lower body injuries. It was Dr. Kade's
opinion that the fractures caused terminal bronchial pneumonia and resulted in Hawley's death. He stated that the
pattern of the fractures indicated that Hawley's rib cage
collapsed from a crushing force exerted on the front of his
chest. In Dr. Kade's opinion Hawley was lying on his back
on a flat surface when the force was exerted, and was struck
several blows on the chest with a heavy flat object.
Shipp and Jones were arrested on January 2. On January 8
they were taken to a room in the hall of justice, where they
made voluntary statements to the police. Recordings of those
statements were made without defendants' knowledge and
were received in evidence at the trial. Jones gave the following account:
He and Shipp were in the lobby of the President Hotel on

)

848

)

PEOPIJE t'. SHIPP

the night of December 30, 1961. They saw Wilkinson enter tlIl'
hotel and board the elevator. 'l'hey ran up the stairs to the
third floor and went to Wilkinson's room. They unlocked the
door with a master key that Shipp was carrying. When
Wilkinson entered, Jones hit him. He found 90 cents in
Wilkinson's poeket, which he took. Wilkinson began to struggle, and Jones hit him again. He searched the room and
found some hair oil and a cigarette lighter. He hit Wilkinson
again. Shipp then hit Wilkinson "a couple of times more"
and they left.
On Shipp's suggestion they went to Hawley's room on the
fourth floor. The master key would not open the door. They
knocked, and Shipp said, "This is Eddy the guy downstairs." (Eddy was the night clerk of the hotel.) They heard
a voice in the room, but the door was not opened, and they
broke in. Shipp grabbed Hawley, and Jones attempted to
close the door. The door would not latch. At that point Jones
heard someone in the hall, and then felt someone push on the
door. Jones held the door with his foot and hands. The
person in the hall left, and Jones was able to latch the door.
When Hawley made a noise, Jones told Shipp to keep him
quiet. Jones then noticed that Shipp had his arm around
Hawley's neck and that Hawley was bleeding from one ear.
Jones ripped a pocket from Hawley's trousers and took his
wallet. Shipp and Jones searched the closet and found nothing. When Hawley again made a noise, Shipp "went back
over there and held him down and shut him up with his hand
over his mouth or something." Jones then searched the
dressei, under the bed, and under the mattress while Shipp
held Hawley. Jones believed that Shipp struck Hawley once
with his fist.
Shipp and Jones then went to Jones' room on the third
floor. They looked in the wallets (Jones believed there were
two) and found nothing. Shipp said, "I'm going back upstairs because I think maybe we missed something." Shipp
left, and Jones went to bed.
At the conclusion of his statement, Jones said that on the
night of the robberies Shipp wore a light jacket and a light
shirt. He noticed blood on the sleeve of the jacket and warned
Shipp to get rid of it.
Shipp denied returning to Hawley's room, and then said,
"The other night of the robbery, the first man Barney
[Wilkinson] -it was all like Verne [Jones] said. " Shipp
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admitted cOlllmitting both robberi('S with Jones and agreed
with J oues' lIccount of tllClll, except that he denied striking
Hawley, Ill' denied kicking Hawley. He could not remember
whether he lJad W01'11 a jacket or just a white T-shirt. When
Ilsk('d about blood found 011 his shoe, he stated, "Now, like I
said, it had to have Come from the fourth floor, it had to.
'fhat's the only possible way the blood could have gotten Oil
the shoes." He stated that he tried to get the wallet out of
Hawley's pocket, "but Verne pulled this tiling off. H
Jones' palm print was found on the inside of the door to
Hawley's room on January 2. 'When Shipp was arrested a
jacket was found in his closct. The jacket and one of ShiPl) 's
shoes were stained with w11at appeared to be blood. A key was
among Shipp's belollgings at the county jail. Officer Sel'ct
took the key to the President Hotel and found that it unlocked
the door to Wilkillson's room, but 110t the door to Ha wiey '8
room.
Officer Rodney testified for the prosecution that on January 11, 1962, hc searched the room that Sllipp had occupied
and found a journal and two Coast F~'deral Savings passbooks
behind a refrigerator. Another witness identified handwriting
on the journal as Hawley's, and tcstified that Hawley had an
account at Coast Fed!'ral Savings. On cross-examination Oilieel' Rodney admitted that he 11ad made an investigation report
concerning his "activities in the case." Shipp's motion ·for
production of the report for the purposes of impeachment
was denied. J
[1] We agree with Shipp's cOlltelltion that it was error to
dell)" production of Officer Rodney's report. A suffiei!'nt
foundation for production was laid by showing that the witness had made a report relating to matters covered in his
testimony. (People v. Estrada, 54 Ca1.2d 713, 716 [7 Cal
Rptr. 897, 355 P.2d 641] ; Funk Y. Supcrim' Coltrt, 52 Ca1.2d
423 [340 P.2d 593] ; People Y. Chapman, 52 Cal.2d 95, 98·99
[338 P.2d 428].)
In deciding whether this error was prejudicial, we must
determine whether there was a reasonable probability that tIle
jury would have reached a different verdict had the report
been produced. (People v, Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 588 [305
P.2d 1].) Since we do not know tIle contents of the report, we
must assume that production would have enabled Shipp to
impeach Officer Rodney and thereby neutralize his testimony.
The issue, therefore, is whether it is reasonably probable that
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the verdict would have been different had Officer Rodney's
testimony been excluded. 1
Officer Rodney's testimony tended to prove that Shipp
robbed Hawley. It is not reasonably probable, howevcr, that
the jury's conclusion on that issue would have been different
without Officer Rodney's testimony. Shipp admitted that he
committed the robbery, and the evidence corroborating that
admission is overwhelming.
Officer Rodney's testimony also tended to discredit Shipp's
testimony, because it contradicted Shipp's claim that he knew
nothing about the passbooks and journal. Shipp's testimony,
however, was contradicted by other evidence. He denied
telling Jones that he would get rid of his jacket. Jones testi.
fied to the contrary. Shipp denied that he ever intended to
rob Hawley, though he admitted that he broke into Hawley's
room, that he held his hand over Hawley's mouth while Jones
searched the room, and that when he left the room Hawley
was lying on the floor and bleeding from the ear. He testified
that the blood on his jacket and shoe came from a fight he had
been in before the robberies. When asked why he had previously stated that the blood must have come from the fourth
floor, he explained that the fight occurred on the fourth floor.
He claimed that he mentioned the fight during his recorded
statement, and theorized that it was not recorded because the
recorder was turned off. Officer Benson testified that the
recorder was not turned off at any time during the taking of
the statements and that the tape accurately and fairly reflected what was said.
Shipp's testimony was not only contradicted, but was inconsistent with his recorded statement and with Jones' statement,
which Jones repeated on the stand. Shipp denied that Haw.
ley's door had been latched or that he had said he was Eddy.
When confronted with his recorded statements to the contrary,
lIt appears that this evidence might have been excluded on another
ground. Shipp's objection to the aumission of the passbooks and journal
on the ground they were obtained by an illegal search was overruled.
Officer Rodney admitted that he did not have a warrant for the search of
Shipp's room. 'rhe prosecution then had the burden of showing justifica·
tion. (Priestly v. SUpe.-iOT Court, 50 Ca1.2d 812, 816 [330 P.2d 39].)
Officer Rodney testified that at the time of the search the room was.
"'-arant," and that a janitor was present during the search. Although
it might be inferred that at the time of the sear(lh the room had no tenant
and that the hotel management consenteu to the search, the evidence to
that effect is ambiguous. Under the circumstances the prosecution could
have made a clear showing of a valid consent, if in fact the room had no
tenant and the hotel management had authorized the search.
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he (~xplaillcd that his ])I'io1' statt>lllellts were lies. lIe denied
trying' to get tlw wallet from Hawley's pocket, but did not
explain w]IY he ]Iud admitted doing so ill his recorded statement. He denied that lie saw Jones take Hawlcy's wallet,
though he had previously admitted seeing Jones rip off the
pocket fl'om whicll Shipp had attempted to remove the wallet.
In view of these contradictions and inconsistencies and the
impluusiblcexplauations offered by Shipp, it is not reasonably
probable that without Officer Rodney's testimony the jury
would have believed Shipp's testimony. Nor is it reasonably
probable tllat without Officer Rodney's testimony the jury
would Jun'e found Shipp innocent of the beating that caused
Hawley's death. Since Jones denied any knowledge of the
passbooks and journal, the finding of that property in Shipp's
room tended to pron~ that Shipp alone made a second visit to
Hawley'S room. Had that evidence been excluded, it is possiblc that thc jury would llave concluded that Shipp did not
return to Hawley's room. It is not reasonably probable,
however, that this conclusion would have led the jury to then
conclude that Shipp did lIot inflict the fatal beating.
Shipp admitted bt'ating and robbillg Wilkinson. He admitted going to Ha,vley's room immediately thereafter. It
was his task to keep Hawley quiet, and he accomplished a
similar task by beating Wilkinson. Three times Hawley
made a noise and was quieted by Shipp. Jones denied seeing
Shipp kick Hawley, but he was holding the door and searching the room and could not have seen everything Shipp did.
He testified that he saw Shipp strike Hawley with his fist and
hold an arm around Hawley's neck and a hand over his
mouth. When Jones left the room, he saw that Hawley was
lying on the floor and moaning. Blood was coming from
Hawley's car. Shipp's jacket and shoe were stained with
blood. Hawley stated that the two men who robbed him also
struck him and kicked him numerous times. His description
of the way his assailants broke into his room was substantially
similar to that giyen by Shipp and Jones in their recorded
statements and by Jones' testimony.
It is true that Hawley identified his attackers as "two
white men," and that Shipp and Jones are Negroes. He later
admitted, however, that he did not see them and did not
really know. Moreover, Shipp and Jones admit that they
attacked and robbed Hawley. Hawley was conscious and
unhurt when they broke into his room. Hawley did not say
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t.hat two separate pairs of men broke into his room. If there
was a second pair, Hawley was apparently not conscious of
tll<'m.
It is possible that Hawley was assaulted by two white men
after Shipp and Jones left his room. It is possible that
Hawley was conscious and saw them but believed tl1at they
were the same men who had robbed him. These possibilities,
however, are not materially reduced by Officer Rodney's testi.
mony. We do not believe that the exclusion of his testimony
would have made it more likely that the jury would believe
that after Shipp and Jones left Hawley's room two other men
entered and inflicted the fatal injuries.
[2] At the beginning of the trial it was established that
Shipp was 19 years of age. His motion for certification to
the juvenile court 'vas denied. Shipp contends that certifica·
tion was mandatory under section 604, subdivision (b), of the
Welfare and Institutions Code, which provides: "Whenever a
case is pending in any court upon an accusatory pleading and
it appears to the satisfaction of the judge that the person
charged is under the age of 21 years, the judge may certify
the case to the juvenile court in his county in the manner pre·
scribed by subdivision (a) of this section." (Italics added.)
Subdivision (a) provides that if the defendant is under the
age of 18 years the trial judge must suspend proceedings
and certify the defendant to the juvenile court.
Subdivision (b) gives the trial court discretion to deny cer·
tification if the defendant is from 18 to 20 years of age. Shipp
contends, however, that unless the ,vord "may" in subdivision
(b) is construed as "must," the provision is "unconstitutionally vague" and denies equal protection of the laws because it contains no standards to guide the trial judge iii. exercising his discretion. This contention is without merit. Subdivision (b) does not authorize the trial judge arbitrarily or
capriciously to grant or deny certification tothe juvenile court.
Even though the statute contains no express standards, the
trial judge must exercise his discretion reasonably and in
furtherance of justice. (Cf. Ordway v. Arata, 150 Cal.App.2d
71 [309 P.2d 919] [Code Civ. Proc;, § 583]; Georgison v.
Georgison,43 Ca1.2d 550 [275 P.2d 3] [Code Civ. Proc., § 685] ;
National Electric Supply Co. v. Mt. Diablo Unified School
Dist., 187 Cal.App.2d 418 [9 Cal.Rptr. 864] [Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1048] ; People v. Romero, 156 Cal.App.2d 48, 51 [318 P.2d
835] [Code Civ. Proc., § 2042] ; In rc Newbern, 55 Ca1.2d 500,
503·504 [11 Cal.Rptr. 547, 360 P.2d 43] [Pen. Code, § 1272].)
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By implication s('ction 604 rcquires thc trial court to exercise
its discretion to serve tIle purposes of the Juv('nile Court Lal\'.
(Cf. In "e l'cte1'sen, 51 Cal.2d 177,185 (331 P.2d 24, 77 A.L.R.
2d 1291J; People v. Bal'llett, 27 Ca1.2d 649,656 [166 P.2d 4].)
[3] The trial court did not abuse its discretioll in refusing
to certify Sllipp to the juvenile court. The nature of the
charges against him justifies the conclusion that he was not a
fit subjl'ct for consideration in the juvenile court. (See Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 606; People v. Yeager, 55 Ca1.2d 374, 389 [10
Ca1.Rptr. 829, 359 P.2d 261].)
[4] The trial court did not err in excusing prospective
jurors conscientiously opposed to t1le dC'uth. penalty. ( People
v. Love, 56 Cal.!?d 720, 726 [16 Ca1.Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.Rptr.
481, 366 P.2d 33, 809] ; Prople Y. J)uncan, 53 Ca1.2d 803, 816
[3 Cal.Rptr. 331,350 P.2d 103J ; People v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566,
575,576 [305 P.2d 1], eert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 [77 S.Ct. 721,
1 L.Ed.2d 724J.) It is immaterial that tIle trial court ('xcused
the jurors on its own motion. It was required to examine th('
prospective jurors. (Pen. Code, § 1078.) When that examination revealed tIl\' jurors' conscientiolls objections, it was the
trial court's duty to excuse them. (Cf. People v. Goldenson,
76 Cal. 328, 346 [19 P. 161J.)
[5] At the trial Shipp moved that the issues of guilt and
penalty be tried tog<.>ther. The motion was denied under section 190.1 of the Penal Code. Shipp contends that section
190.1 was enacted for the bf'l1efit of defendants and therf>fore
can be waived. He further contends that if it cannot be
waived it is unconstitutional. These contentions are without
merit. The provisions of s<.>etion 190.1 establishing the bifurcated trial are mandatory, and their constitutionality is
settled. (People v. Love., 56 Ca1.2d 720, 725 [16 Cal.Rptr. 777,
17 Ca1.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33,809] ; People v. Corwin, 52 Cal.
2d 404, 407 [340 P.2d 626] ; People v. Dltflcan, 51 Cal.2d 523,
529 [334 P.2d 858] ; People v. Feldkamp, 51 Cal.2d 237, 240241 [331 P.2d 632] ; People. v. Wm'd, 50 Ca1.2d 702, 706-711
[328 P.2d 777, 76 A.L.R.2d 911] ; Ward v. State of California
(9th Cir. 1959) 269 1<'.2<1 906.)
[6] During nrgulllf>nt on the penalty counsel for Shipp
argued that tIll' death plHlalty is not morally permissible in
any case. In i:!nppurt of this arg'ument he attempted to read
a newspaper article tlHlt apparently rl'portetl all attempt to
abolish the death peualty in the IJcgislatul'<'>. Shipp contends Ulat the trial cOllrt erred in refusing to pcrmit the reading of the article to the jury.
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Counsel's argument was improper. The choice between the
death penalty and life imprisonment is within the discretion
of the jury. (Pen. Code, § 190.) "General views of the social
desirability or moral permissibility of capital punishment
could logically have no place among the factors influencing
the exercise of a discretion so conceived." (People v. Riser,
47 Ca1.2d 566, 575 [305 P.2d 1].) By arguing that capital
punishment is not proper ill any case, counsel in effect urged
the jury to disregard the IJegislature's determination to the
contrary. Moreover, the newspaper article had not been introduced in evidence, nor did it state matters of common knowledge of which the jury could take judicial notice. (See People
Y. Love, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 730-732 [16 Cal.Rptr. 177, 17 Cal.Rptr.
481,366 P.2d 33, 809].)
There is no merit in tIle contention that the trial court committed prejudicial error in several rulings on evidence.
The judgment on each count is affirmed.
Gibson, C.J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner,
J., and Peek, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 17,
1963.

